This clandestine web of police spies links almost every major city in the United States and Canada. But it is so secret that few people even know it exists and so powerful that it does as it pleases while answering to no one.

**AMERICA'S SECRET POLICE NETWORK**

In today's society blackmail has replaced physical force as the currency of political power brokerage. J. Edgar Hoover knew that power lies between the manila covers of a personal dossier, and he used that knowledge to build and maintain his empire for almost half a century. The FBI, the CIA, and virtually every other agency given the authority to spy to defend us from foreign or domestic enemies have sooner or later gone off the reservation and used their power to steal our liberties.

In contrast to the CIA and the FBI, the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit is a little-known organization; in fact, almost no one has ever heard of it. But its power is considerable, and its potential threat to our freedom is enormous.

The LEIU links the intelligence squads of almost every major police force in the United States and Canada. Although its members are sworn police officers who work for state and city governments, it is a private club, not answerable to voters, taxpayers, or elected officials. It cuts across the vertical lines of authority of local government, for its members hold certain allegiances to the group that cannot

*BY GEORGE O'TOOLE*
THE SECRET LEIU MEMBERSHIP LIST

The following confidential membership list of the LEIU was compiled in October 1973 and is probably still at least 90 percent accurate. The following abbreviations are used: C—County; P.D.—Police Department; D.A.—District Attorney; S.D.—Sheriff's Department.

<table>
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<th>ALABAMA</th>
<th>ALASKA</th>
<th>ARIZONA</th>
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<th>CALIFORNIA</th>
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<th>CONNECTICUT</th>
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The LEIU is divided into four geographic zones: eastern, central, northwestern, and southwestern. Each zone is governed by a chairman and a vice-chairman. Nationally, there are also a general chairman, a general vice-chairman, a secretary, and a treasurer. The national and zone officers comprise a twelve-member executive board, which governs the organization. The LEIU holds national and regional conventions every year. Lake Headley describes the conventions as “big club meetings.”

It’s not easy to join the LEIU. When applying for membership, a police force must be sponsored by another agency already in the LEIU and must be endorsed by three others. All members are notified of the application, and the LEIU carries out a thorough investigation of the applicant agency and the officers who work for it and will take part in LEIU activities. Finally, the executive board votes on the application.

“It’s a very selective, very elitist sort of thing,” says former member Lake Headley. “In a local intelligence squad you kind of look to the LEIU may jump into a phone booth and come dashing out in a Superman suit.”

The protective cloak of obscurity shielding the LEIU from public view was briefly lifted last year when the Houston, Tex., Police Department left the organization.
Houston police officials announced that their department was resigning from the LEIU after it had received requests from other member agencies for information on the private lives of people with absolutely no criminal connections. In one instance cited by the Houston officials, a California police department asked for a full-scale investigation of a highly respected Houston businessman who had requested a liquor license to sell beer in a chain of grocery stores in California. The inquiry reportedly included a request for information about the man's investments, business associates, family life, and even his sex habits.

LEIU national chairman Ray Henry denies the allegation, describing it as "a bunch of sour grapes." The Houston Police Department didn't quit the LEIU, according to Lieutenant Henry. "They were kicked out by me because they had something like 200 officers indicted for illegal wiretapping. We're not going to put up with that kind of crap," Lieutenant Henry said that he had a power of attorney to operate the LEIU, and that the Houston Police Department was expelled from the LEIU prior to its announced resignation, and that the present Houston chief of police had directed the earlier charges by his subordinates that the LEIU spied on nondelinquent subjects.

The self-proclaimed sensitivity of the Houston cops to the privacy of ordinary citizens does seem a bit implausible in view of the department's own record, which has recently come to light. Houston has been the scene of one of the major police-spying scandals of recent years, involving the department's Criminal Intelligence Division, the FBI, and the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company. The affair probably was the cause of Houston's expulsion from the LEIU, although Lieutenant Henry's pious condemnation of the department's illegal wiretapping serves to mask what is probably the LEIU's true reason for expelling the Texas cops.

In 1973 Houston elected liberal Democrat Fred Hofheinz as mayor. Hofheinz promptly made good his campaign promise to replace Houston's hard-line, law-and-order police chief, whose department had frequently been charged with brutality to blacks. Hofheinz's new chief, Carroll M. Lynn, soon discovered that under his predecessor the police department had carried out a ten-year program of political spying. The Criminal Intelligence Division had amassed dossiers on more than a thousand nondelinquent subjects. Most of the individuals spied upon were liberals, black activists, or civil libertarians, although the cops had also taken an interest in some conservatives. Chief Lynn found dossiers on liberal Congresswoman Barbara Jordan and conservative Congressman Bob Case.

There was also another thick file on Fred Hofheinz, the new mayor. The police spy files were chock-full of personal information, often including sexual gossip, and much of the data could have been acquired only through wiretapping. Texas has no state law for regulating wiretapping, and under a 1968 federal statute, local police in such states are forbidden to tap phones under any circumstances, electronic eavesdropping can be done only by federal agents with court orders. Chief Lynn launched an internal investigation in order to determine how the information in the files had been obtained. The probe disclosed that the Houston police had conducted more than a thousand illegal wiretaps during a seven-year period.

The files of the Houston Criminal Intelligence Division were sequestered on the order of a federal judge and were turned over to a federal grand jury investigating the affair. The sequestered files included not only the standard CID dossiers but also one full set of the special files of the LEIU—the complete assortment of intelligence information that Captain Hamilton and his successors had succeeded in keeping out of the hands of the federal authorities for almost twenty years. In the words of Lieutenant Henry, the Houston cops had permitted the LEIU files to be "seized by civilians," and it is this surrender, rather than the telephone tapping, that seems the
The LEIU flatly refuses to show its files to anyone who is not a member—including FBI agents.

more plausible explanation for Houston's expulsion from the LEIU.

Custody of the LEIU's files is the most sacred trust that the organization bestows upon its individual members. The LEIU not only withholds its files from the FBI and other federal authorities but also flatly refuses to show them to anyone who is not a LEIU member. Former member Mike Headley recalls that access to the locked LEIU file cabinets could not be shared by two officers working on the same case unless both were LEIU members. (Today all officers assigned full-time to the intelligence squad of a regular member agency are considered LEIU members and have full access to the files.) In some instances a police officer is designated as an "affiliate member" of the LEIU, meaning that he, but not the department for which he works, belongs to the LEIU; he is the only person in the entire department who may look at the LEIU files. Even a request by the chief of police or by the police commissioner would have to be refused.

Both regular and affiliate LEIU members are forbidden to show the organization's secret dossiers to "civilians." It makes no difference that the chief of police is appointed by the mayor or the city council and serves at their pleasure; he cannot obey any order to make the LEIU files available to them.

"We've had numerous cases where some political figure has tried to gain access," Lieutenant Henry told me. "We had an agency not so long ago where our members voluntarily resigned from LEIU and returned the files because they weren't sure they could keep their mayor away from them. Nonmembers don't have the need to know or the right to know."

Freedom-of-information and privacy laws enacted by the federal government and several of the states give every citizen the right to know what is in government files, especially dossiers in which his own name may be, but the LEIU is completely exempt from such laws. The LEIU is a private club and therefore not subject to freedom-of-information or privacy laws. Thus the LEIU files are more secret than those of the CIA or the FBI.

Any LEIU member can open a file on an individual simply by filling out a form and obtaining the approval of the local LEIU regional chairman. The form is forwarded to the California Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation in Sacramento, a part of the state's Division of Law Enforcement that voluntarily acts as a central coordinating agency for the LEIU. (The LEIU's private status has not prevented it from receiving generous support from state and federal government agencies.) The Special Services Section of the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation summarizes all the information provided on the individual and puts it on a five-by-eighth-inch card, along with a photograph, if one is available. Copies of the card are sent to all LEIU members, to be kept under lock and key in the special LEIU file cabinets.

Some of the LEIU files have been entered into the Interstate Organized Crime Index, a computerized file system developed and operated by the LEIU under a $1.3 million grant from the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The IOCI system is an international network of computer terminals, linked by telecommunications lines to a central computer run by the Michigan State Police in East Lansing, Mich. Last year the LEAA cut off all funds for the IOCI system.

"The Justice Department put it on ice," said Lieutenant Henry, blaming the cutoff on public concern over domestic spying. "They decided not to fund anything that uses the word "intelligence" unless the baby dies first. But they just recently called us up and said the pressure is off," he added. "So we may be back on again in a few months."

Pressure on the LEIU resulted from the Houston police charges and from statements made by a former Des Moines police officer, who told investigators for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that he had served as an undercover agent for the LEIU and was assigned to spy on non-criminal subjects. Douglass Durham, an accomplished pilot, safecracker, photographer, and electronic eavesdropping specialist, said that he was part of an LEIU-sponsored exchange program in which undercover officers were traded between police departments in the Midwest. Durham says he was lent by the Des Moines police to work undercover for the police departments of Lincoln, Nebraska, and Cedar Rapids, Iowa. He says that some of his assignments involved the surveillance of political dissidents.

Lieutenant Henry denies that Durham worked for the LEIU; the organization employs no undercover investigators, he says. (But individual LEIU member agencies are committed to conduct undercover investigations, surveillances, and background checks for other member agencies, on request. Durham actually claims only to have worked undercover for the Des Moines Police Department in an exchange program sponsored by the LEIU. The Des Moines, Cedar Rapids, and Lincoln police departments are LEIU members and, presumably, use undercover investigators.) Lieutenant Henry also denies that the LEIU keeps files on anyone but people involved in organized crime, adding, "I hope that story has been laid to rest, because it's..."
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totally false.
But, when Donald H. Carroll, then LEIU
general chairman, testified before a Senate
subcommittee probing criminal-justice
data banks in 1974, he defined the pur-
pose of the LEIU as, "the gathering, record-
ing, investigating, and exchange of confi-
dential information not available through
regular police channels on individuals and
organizations involved in, but not neces-
sarily limited to," organized crime (em-
phasis added). And a 1973 report on the
Interstate Organized Crime Index con-
tained this statement: "The LEIU data base
was comprised of persons of interest to
intelligence units other than organized
crime subjects." Lieutenant Henry had a
copy of the report, and I asked him about
the statement.
"I don't understand that statement at all," he
said. "I didn't see it, or it certainly would
have been cleaned up. There are no sub-
jects in the LEIU data base except those
involved as either principals or associates
in organized crime activities. They don't
have to belong to La Cosa Nostra, but
they've got to be involved in some con-
spiratorial organized crime activity.""Would the LEIU's definition of organized
crime include radicals or bomb-throwers?"
I asked.
"No, it certainly does not," Lieutenant
Henry replied. "The LEIA [Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration] has often
asked us to include that kind of individual,
and we finally told them to get off the sub-
ject. We're not in that kind of business!""The 1973 report containing a copy of the
mysterious statement was written by a
group headed by Charles E. Casey, assist-
ant director of the Organized Crime
and Criminal Intelligence Branch of the Califor-
ia Department of Justice (an LEIU
member agency). I called him and asked
what the statement meant.
"I'm not sure, I can explain what it
means," he replied. "The LEIU data base is
100 percent organized crime, except for a
few of what I would call 'arrested or iden-
tified terrorists.' I really couldn't explain
the statement, right off the bat."
What is an "identified terrorist," and how
does he or she differ from the "arrested"
variety? The answer is that it's not neces-
sary to have been convicted of any crime,
or even arrested, in order to earn oneself a
LEIU dossier, according to the 1974 Sen-
ate testimony of then LEIU general chair-
man Donald Carroll. An "identified ter-
rorist" is anyone the LEIU believes to be a
terrorist.
Lieutenant Henry's "no bomb-throwers
or radicals" claim seems in direct con-
tradiction to Casey's admission that the
LEIU files contain "a few terrorists," and
neither man offers a very adequate explana-
tion of the "persons other than organized
crime subjects" slip appearing in the report
of an LEIA-funded study that Casey him-
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self directed. Still, what does it matter if the LEIU has added a few bombers, kidnappers, and hijackers to its collection of loan sharks, pimps, hit men, and gamblers? The disturbing thing about the LEIU files is that the criteria for opening a dossier on someone seem rather vague and subjective. If a person can be deemed a member of an organized crime even though he doesn’t belong to the Mafia, has never been convicted of anything, and has never been arrested, one is moved to wonder whether the LEIU’s definition of an “identified terrorist” is broad enough to include people who simply disagree with the government.

Lt. J.O. Brannon is a Houston police intelligence officer and the spokesman who first charged the LEIU with spying on law-abiding citizens. I asked him if he would describe the kinds of noncriminal subjects in the LEIU files. Unfortunately, he could not discuss the specific contents of any of the files seized by the federal court, but his general comments served to put the LEIU in better perspective.

Lieutenant Brannon minimized the importance of the LEIU’s special files. He said that the really important information is contained in the full dossiers maintained by each LEIU member agency and made available to every other member agency.

“Wouldn’t those files be exchanged between police forces, even without the LEIU?” I asked. Not necessarily, Lieutenant Brannon informed me.

Cops can be as suspicious of each other as they are of “civilians.” A police intelligence officer who makes a long-distance call to his counterpart in another law-enforcement agency may encounter regional or political mistrust, big city—small town bias, or any of a variety of other obstacles impeding an easy exchange of information. For Lieutenant Brannon, the real value of the LEIU is overcoming this resistance through the regional and national meetings that the group holds annually.

“The LEIU meetings are mostly social affairs, but you build up lasting friendships when you go out and have a few drinks with an old boy,” Lieutenant Brannon explained. “Then, when he calls you up, you know who you’re talking to, because you looked him in the eye just last week—some guy four states away. It’s the closeness of the damn thing that I like.”

Brannon said that expulsion from the LEIU hadn’t made much difference to the Houston police. They still retained the LEIU directory listing the name and phone number of every LEIU contact in the more than 225 member agencies. Houston continues to exchange dossiers with the other LEIU members.

Regarding the current Houston spying scandal, Brannon observed, “We spread our wings too far and exceeded what was proper, tapping a few phones and doing a few other things. The damn thing got out of hand here, but I’m reasonably sure they were doing the same thing in every other city. They just didn’t get caught at it.”

In fact, several other LEIU member agencies did get caught at it during the same period as the Houston revelations. In Michigan the State Police and the Detroit Police Department—both LEIU members—were charged with infiltrating and wiretapping a suburban Detroit consumer group at the request of state legislators who had been criticized by the organization. In New York a State Supreme Court judge charged New York City’s Public Security Unit—the current name for the NYPD Red Squad—with carrying out an open, free-wheeling people-watching mission.

And in Washington, D.C. Senators Henry Jackson and Charles Percy asked the General Accounting Office to investigate how police departments use federal funds to carry out illegal spying activities in the nation’s ten largest cities. (The police departments of seven of the ten cities are LEIU members.) But the most devastating revelations of police spying came out of Baltimore and Chicago—both LEIU members—where snooping scandals rivaled that of Houston.

The Chicago affair began when the Afro-American Patrolmen’s League, which was involved in a discrimination suit against the police department, filed a routine request to subpoena whatever files the local intelligence squad held on the league. From the records obtained by the court, it was clear that the police had amassed files on a host of organizations and individuals having no apparent criminal connections. The police department’s Subversive Unit—or, as it was generally called, the Red Squad—had compiled dossiers not only on the obvious targets of police suspicion, such as political dissidents, but also on such personalities as former Chicago Bears football star Gale Sayers and local television commentator Len O’Connor. Gaylord Freeman, the chairman of the First National Bank, and Arthur Woods, chairman of Sears, Roebuck, and Company, earned themselves dossiers by donating money to a civil rights organization.

Dossiers had also been opened on Fr. Theodore Hesburgh, the president of Notre Dame University, Chicago Daily News columnist Mike Royko, the late Jackie Robinson, Republican mayoral candidate John Hoellen, and an assortment of state and federal legislators. The Red Squad had files on the Chicago Metropolitan Area Housing Alliance; the organization for a Better Austin (a section of Chicago); and the Citizen’s Action Program, a group dedicated to fighting the proposed Crosstown Expressway. A file had been started on a Chicago doctor because the police had observed his car parked in the same neighborhood where the Illinois Communist party was holding a meeting.

“Not tonight dear, I have a headache.”

200 PENTHOUSE
The Red Squad's gumshoes took a few deductive shortcuts in writing up their reports. If someone's car was parked in the same neighborhood in which a certain group was holding a meeting, that meant he had attended the meeting. If he had attended the meeting twice, then he was a member of the group. Such "facts" were recorded in a dossier and also forwarded to the FBI for inclusion in its files. And the allegation was available for swapping with any of the 225 other LEIU member agencies.

In Baltimore a Maryland State Senate investigating committee probed charges that the Police Department's Inspectional Services Division had spied on politicians, newsmen, and clergymen. They found that the police intelligence squad had also spied on labor unions, colleges and universities, and civic groups concerned with such things as rodent control, highway relocation, and utility rates. In the words of one ISD officer, "If there was a meeting in Baltimore City, we were there."

Baltimore's police commissioner, Donald D. Pomerleau, was not in the least shy about admitting that he had compiled information on practically everybody. In fact, Pomerleau often boasted of the thickness of his dossiers and told the quaking visitor to his office, "I know where you meet, when you are going to meet before you meet, what you do..." In one case Pomerleau summoned an individual to his office, showed him his dossier, and watched with despotic satisfaction as the wretch fell to his knees before him and begged the police commissioner not to release the information. It must have been a high point in the 300-plus-year history of Baltimore.

The Maryland Senate investigating committee found that "ISD had amassed a data bank containing the names of, and information pertaining to, hundreds, perhaps thousands, of citizens of this state, many of whom did nothing more than testify with respect to a particular piece of legislation before the Baltimore City Council or peaceably walk a picket line." The committee noted that "the feeling seemed to prevail in ISD that persons who deviated from the norm, who were outspoken or criticized the status quo, members of organized labor, picketers, and protesters—these people were 'potential threats' and society must be protected against them."

In an interview with the Chicago Tribune, a Chicago Red Squad officer declared, "I believe in the American flag, and I want it to stay American and not turn Pink. The way things are run now, democracy is running wild. Everyone is allowed to do anything he wants. I believe the country, the state, and the city come before individual rights."

A Chicago grandmother who was paid twenty-five dollars per month by the Red Squad to infiltrate church and community groups told reporters from the Chicago Daily News, "I am a police spy, and I am proud of it. I do police-spy work because, as far as I'm concerned, God and Country

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Amaretto di Saronno.
Originale. From the Village of Love.

come first. You guys are so busy worry ing about constitutional rights, along with the Communists, that they're going to take us over."

Some might say that such attitudes are typical of the point of view of the police, but there is little about police intelligence offi cers that is typical of most policemen. Within a police department the intelligence squad is almost as alien as it is within society as a whole. In Baltimore many veteran officers were completely unaware of the existence of the Inspectors Services Divi sion. Fewer than forty officers in the department had any idea of the unit's function, and only a small percentage of those who did had been fully briefed on its operation. In fact, the Baltimore cops were themselves targets of ISD spying when they went out on strike in 1974; undercover offi cers from the unit photographed policemen as they walked picket lines outside their station houses.

In Chicago, too, the Red Squad's activities were shrouded from the rest of the police department. Recruits selected to serve in the unit bypassed training in the police academy so that former classmates couldn't identify them later. Senior Chicago police officials claimed to a grand jury that they were ignorant of the Red Squad's activities. But the most bizarre example of the chasm between Red Squad officers and the cop on the beat is the case of one undercover officer who infiltrated a Chicago group and eventually became its president. He admitted to the Cook County Grand Jury probing police-spying activities that he had specifically urged other members of the organization to shoot Chicago policemen and had even demonstrated the most strategic way to place snipers in downtown Chicago so that they could blow away the greatest number of his fellow officers.

Conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is the worst, but by no means the only case of lawbreaking by police intelligence squads perpetrated by the LEIU. The Chicago Red Squad, for example, carried out a six-year program of burglary, vandalism, and assault in collaboration with a hoodlum gang masquerading as a patriotic group and calling itself the "Legion of Justice." The legion was the brainchild of the late right-wing Chicago attorney S. Thomas Sutton, who recruited an unsavory assortment of local thugs with patriotic pretensions to harass peace groups and serve as the unofficial shock troops of the Chicago Red Squad. From 1967 to 1973 the Legion of Justice carried out a series of break-ins, trashings, and bombings on antiwar groups, often under the approving gaze of Chicago police officers parked nearby in their squad cars. In some of the break-ins, especially those in which illegal bugging devices were planted, members of the Red Squad served as lookouts while the legion hoodlums did the actual burglary. The most common type of crimminality among LEIU intelligence squads is illegal wiretapping, which is almost always done with some degree of cooperation from the local telephone company. A former Baltimore vice-squad officer told the Maryland Senate investigating committee that the intelligence squad routinely installed illegal telephone taps with the aid of an ex-cop who worked for the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company. A phone company spokesman denied the charge. In Houston some of the officers who admitted taking part in illegal wiretapping said that the taps had been placed with the full cooperation of the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company and named some 200 phone-company employees as having helped in the illicit eavesdropping. Southwestern Bell denied the charge, although a Bell spokesman said that he could not rule out the possibility that some of the company's 14,000 employees might have violated company policy and taken part in the wiretapping.

Ties between Southwestern Bell and the Houston law-enforcement establishment are very close. The phone company employs about seventy Houston policemen to moonlight as security guards. Eight company officials held commissions as Special Texas Rangers, with the full arrest and weapons powers of state police officers. And fourteen or fifteen of the company's forty-four-man security force are former special agents of the FBI. The lines separating Southwestern Bell from local, state, and federal law enforcement have become extremely thin.

Where phone-company cooperation cannot be obtained through the police old-boy network, other means are employed. Chicago Red Squad officers reportedly obtained the help of four Illinois Bell linemen in placing illegal taps after the men were caught by the police in "compromising positions." The "compromising positions" included drunkenness and sexual misconduct, and the linemen were threatened with arrest and exposure if they refused to cooperate.

Telephone companies are by no means the only part of the private sector that aids LEIU intelligence squads. A police textbook on the subject advises intelligence officers to cultivate contacts in utility companies, airlines, banks, newspapers, bond ing companies, private detective agencies, and credit bureaus. The federal Privacy Protection Study Commission recently heard testimony from such companies as American Express and Sheraton Hotels, in which they admitted that they routinely surrendered information about their clients and guests to law-enforcement officers in response to oral requests, without requiring a court order. However, passage of the 1970 Fair Credit Reporting Act severely restricts the information that a credit agency can release without a subpoena.

Until the April 1971 effectiveness of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Baltimore intelligence squad had received the total cooperation of the Credit Bureau of Balti more, Inc., a local consumer credit agency, in obtaining full access to the personal in-
formation in its files. After passage of the federal credit law, however, the Baltimore cops found that an important source of information had suddenly dried up. Several months after the law had gone into effect, Officer Terry Josephson of the intelligence squad left his $9,000-a-year job with the police department and became vice-president of United Credit Bureaus of America, Inc., one of the largest independent consumer credit agencies in the country, which more than doubled his old salary.

United Credit Bureaus of America has files on most citizens of Maryland, and Josephson had unlimited access to this information. An intelligence-squad officer told the Maryland Senate investigating committee that Josephson supplied some of this knowledge to the police without benefit of court order. Josephson denied that he was serving as an undercover informant for the Baltimore intelligence squad; but shortly after his role was publicized, he resigned his $20,000-plus-a-year job with United Credit Bureaus of America and returned to the police department at his old salary.

In fairness to the LEIU, it should be pointed out that the number of member intelligence squads that recently have actually been caught breaking the law or spying on noncriminal citizens represents less than 5 percent of its membership. Nevertheless, in the opinion of one Houston police official, such practices are much more widespread and the recent revelations are only the tip of the iceberg. In one sense, it is remarkable that any of the intelligence squads at all were caught, given the inherent difficulty of investigating the police, who are also in a unique position to cover up their transgressions. In fact, the probes of the intelligence squads in Houston, Baltimore, and Chicago all encountered the same pattern of police resistance and obstruction.

Baltimore Police Commissioner Pomerleau tried unsuccessfully to halt a State Senate investigation of his department by slapping every member of the investigating committee with a lawsuit. Through a variety of delaying tactics, former Chicago Police Supt. James B. Conlisk hamstringed a Cook County Special Grand Jury investigating his department. Conlisk insisted on consulting with his lawyer in an adjoining room whenever the grand jury asked him a question, including such queries as, “When did you become superintendent of the Chicago Police Department?” and, “Did you take an oath to serve and protect the interest of the citizens of the city of Chicago?” During one tiresome three-hour grand-jury session, Conlisk made thirty-one trips between the hearing room and the anteroom, where his lawyer waited. The grand jury recommended that Conlisk be cited for contempt.

In Houston the Police Officers Association ran a full-page newspaper advertisement to complain about their new chief, Carroll M. Lynn, who had made the initial
IN THE DECEMBER VIVA ON YOUR NEWSSTAND NOW

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Jeff Bridges is playing second banana to a huge ape. His role in the new version of King Kong, however, may bring the superstardom that has long eluded him. Guy Hillis profiles this surprisingly complex actor.

THE SAP: A NEW LOOK AT THE SOUTHERN AMERICAN PRINCE

Larry King examines the southern "gentlemen" who make life so miserable for so many women. Any resemblance to Jimmy Carter is entirely coincidental.

DARK SIDE OF THE MOON

Mysterious Parisian photographer Sara Moon has an unusual view of men and women, as shown by her hauntingly beautiful photographs.

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How to beat the holiday blues, fifty ways to give sexier Christmas gifts, inexpensive but unforgettable Christmas parties to end this year with a bang; women writers who are changing science fiction; holiday gifts, wrappings, and makeup; and the true story of the pursuit of the perfect orgasm.

PROBE INTO THE INTELLIGENCE SQUAD'S ILLEGAL WIRETAPPING. Enough pressure was brought to bear upon Chief Lynn to force his resignation, although the investigation, which had been taken over by a federal grand jury, continued.

Police resistance to the probes also went beyond such legal and public-relations maneuvers. In Chicago a state's attorney investigating the police is apprised that his own phone had been tapped. A Baltimore newspaper reporter critical of the police was the target of surveillance and other harassment; on three occasions when he returned to his car parked in the police department's parking lot, he found that the tire tugs had been loosened. Police officers called to testify by the State Senate committee investigating the Baltimore intelligence squad said they feared they would lose their jobs if it was learned that they had cooperated with the committee. In Chicago, many officers who were called in the grand-jury investigation of the Red Squad received the same anonymous telephone message: "We know you have seen the state's attorneys. If you want to stay healthy, you'd better not talk before the grand jury."

During the probe a mysterious fire broke out on the eighth floor of Chicago police headquarters. It seems to have started in one of the filing cabinets containing the Red Squad's files. Other records subpoenaed by the grand jury, such as the Red Squad's electronic-surveillance log, had been "routinely destroyed." The Baltimore intelligence squad "routinely destroyed" many of its files on political dissidents sometime in 1973. According to Houston police intelligence officer Lt. J.O. Brannon, other LEIU members destroyed their files when it seemed as though their political-surveillance activities might be investigated.

"After the government seized our files," he said, "Guess what Los Angeles did? They burned almost every goddamn thing they had. Some of the other cities did the same thing. They called it 'purging the files.' We should have done the same thing, but we didn't know that's what you're supposed to call it."

You might also call it destroying evidence of a felony, unless you were merely grateful that such a collection of sordid gossip had been consigned once and for all to the flames. But such a celebration of the destruction of police dossiers could be premature. An intelligence officer might be able to state under oath to a grand jury or senate committee that the police department no longer has a dossier on John Doe, but such testimony is no insurance that a copy of John Doe's dossier isn't locked away in the file cabinet of another LEIU-member intelligence squad in a city 3,000 miles away, or, for that matter, that some 225 copies of the dossier haven't been distributed to every LEIU member agency. And there is also no guarantee that, after the investigators have completed their probe of the intelligence squad and have turned their attention elsewhere, the squad will not reconstruct its destroyed files from duplicate copies stored elsewhere in the LEIU network. Investigators who look at police intelligence-squad lawlessness as a local problem are victims of a shell game. They have never heard of the LEIU, or, if they have, they don't understand what it is.

But whatever the real or potential abuses of the LEIU, it would be a mistake to regard it as the sinister stepchild of an incipient police state. The LEIU was formed for a very legitimate purpose, and whatever else it may now be up to, it continues to perform a necessary law-enforcement function—the exchange of information on organized crime.

Organized crime is a national enterprise, but the individual police department's jurisdiction ends at the city limits. In pursuit of an illicit buck, loan sharks, narcotics dealers, hit men, and other assorted hoodlums regularly cross state lines and international boundaries with impunity, and the police force that tries to deal with them as a local law-enforcement problem is like a watchdog on a short tether. The cops' basic problem is how to get timely and accurate information on the mobile mobsters who may turn up in their town. But providing that kind of information to the local police sounds like the job of the FBI, not some private group like the LEIU. I asked LEIU general chairman Ray Henry why the bureau isn't doing it.

"That's a hell of a good question, I wish I knew the answer," he replied. "The FBI has got so many rules and regulations about disseminating information to local law-enforcement that you get little or nothing from them. Oh, we exchange information with individual FBI agents, but there is no formal arrangement where information is automatically channeled to all interested agencies by the bureau. That will never happen through the FBI, but it happens daily through the LEIU."

Lieutenant Brannon in Houston put it this way: "The FBI is a good organization, but it's useless to us. It prides itself on its files, but do you know where the information in the FBI files comes from? Your local police department. They come over here and have access to everything they want, but when we try to get some information on a suspect from them, it's a different story. They pull the guy's file, then sit there holding it, and say, 'Okay, what do you want to know?' Well, I want to look through the whole file, but they won't allow that. They won't even let us hold it in our hands. It's never going to change because the FBI has this standoffishness. They figure we're a bunch of dumb-dumbs, and we figure they're a bunch of bureaucrats, and it's hard to break down that barrier."

The cops have always said that dealing with the FBI is like doing business with the sinister stepchild of an incipient police state. Policemen complain that the bureau is uncooperative and less than zealous in fighting the Mob. And after all the recent revelations of FBI abuses of police power, taking away its monopoly on criminal intelligence information may not seem like a completely
bad idea. But the cure could be much worse than the illness; the FBI is, at least in theory, subordinate to the Justice Department and, ultimately, to the public, while the LEIU is a thoroughly private club. In setting up the LEIU, the cops have created the skeleton of a national police force that is also, in essence, a vigilante organization.

Beyond the more obvious hazards to civil rights created by a private national police-intelligence network, there is also the danger that the LEIU can provide a domestic spying apparatus to federal agencies prohibited from setting up their own surveillance machinery within the borders of the United States. U.S. Army Intelligence, which in the recent past has shown a disturbing propensity for spying on Americans, is more than a little chummy with the local cops in many cities. The army trained several Baltimore intelligence-squad officers in techniques of electronic eavesdropping and surreptitious entry at its Fort Holabird spy school in Maryland. In return, the Baltimore cops passed along many of their intelligence reports to the army. In Chicago the Red Squad was in daily contact with the army's 113th Military Intelligence Group during the late 1960s and early 1970s, passing along intelligence reports and receiving a variety of technical assistance. The 113th also provided money, tear-gas bombs, mace, and electronic-surveillance equipment to the Legion of Justice thugs whom the Chicago Red Squad turned loose on local antiwar groups. On at least two occasions, the fruits of the legion's burglaries turned up in army hands. In one case, documents stolen from the defense attorneys in the famous Chicago Seven trial, which grew out of the disturbances at the 1968 Democratic Convention, were turned over to the army by the Legion of Justice hoodlums. For a very familiar reason the Cook County Grand Jury was unable to discover how deeply the 113th was involved with the Chicago Red Squad: the army reported that it had destroyed all its records of the liaison.

How extensive the relationship may be between Army Intelligence and other LEIU member agencies is not clear, but the degree of army involvement with local police forces was indicated recently when the army's Criminal Investigation Command applied for funds (which were ultimately denied) to buy 324 marble paperweights and 50 walnut wall plaques. The items were to be presented to police chiefs across the country who had cooperated with the Army's CIC. It would be remarkable if such cooperation did not at least occasionally include access to the files and other assets of the LEIU.

But Army Intelligence is by no means the only federal agency that might find the LEIU's ready-made dossier network to be of value. Co-opting the local police in foreign countries is standard operating procedure in the CIA's book of tricks. In the past, the agency would select foreign police officers for recruitment when they came to Washington, D.C., to study Ameri-
can police methods at the State Department's International Police Academy. When the recruited officers returned to their jobs in their home countries, they would be on the CIA payroll. CIA watchers familiar with this process were more than a little disturbed to learn that the agency had conducted similar police-training courses for police officers from many police departments within the United States. Of course, such training might have been prompted by the purely altruistic motive of disseminating the advanced police technology developed by the agency for overseas use, but it would be naive to ignore the fact that local police cooperation would be essential to domestic intelligence operations, an area we now know the agency was involved in from the early 1960s. And given the CIA's Operation CHAOS, a program directed at spying on domestic dissidents, it would be doubly naive to suppose the agency has ignored the LEIU network, which links virtually every major Red Squad on the North American Continent.

Douglass Durham, the former Des Moines cop who claims to have worked in an LEIU undercover program, says that he heard of a federal government employee who was involved with LEIU. "He was supposed to be working for the Department of Justice, but I heard rumblings that he was from CIA. Nobody really wanted to say what the connection was."

Durham is rather vague about this mystery man and acknowledges that the report is only scuttlebutt. However, there is one interesting piece of circumstantial evidence suggesting some sort of interface between the CIA and the LEIU. There is only one LEIU member agency in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, and only one LEIU member agency in the entire state of Virginia. It is the same agency, the Fairfax County, Va., Police Department. It's a little surprising that the Fairfax County police belong to a network ostensibly dedicated to fighting organized crime, because there is little indication of Mob activity in Fairfax County, a quiet, upper-income, bedroom suburb of the nation's capital. In fact, the only enterprise with any known Mafia connections located anywhere in Fairfax County is the 125-acre wooded tract that is CIA headquarters.

Ties between the CIA and the Fairfax County police are, to say the least, close. The agency has given the Fairfax cops training in electronic surveillance, surreptitious entry, lockpicking, safecracking, and explosives. It has provided equipment and personnel to assist the police department in several of its investigations. The agency hosted a dinner for one retiring Fairfax police captain who had been particularly helpful and presented him with a $150 watch as a token of its appreciation.

In return for such largesse, the Fairfax police provided the CIA with police badges and identification to be used as cover in domestic investigations. The Fairfax cops have also provided assistance to the agency in staging the "arrest" and interrogation of CIA intelligence officer trainees in order to determine whether they could resist such pressure prior to being assigned overseas. But the greatest act of fealty to the CIA may have been performed in the early hours of February 19, 1971, when several Fairfax County police officers and CIA agents broke into a photographic studio in Fairfax City, Va. The studio was owned by a Cuban refugee whose fiancée was a former CIA file clerk. The agency was afraid that the woman might have taken classified documents and given them to the Cuban; so an illegal entry was mounted in order to search the studio. To ensure that everything went smoothly, the break-in expedition was led by the chief of the Fairfax County police. If the Fairfax police were willing to aid and abet the CIA in the commission of felonies, it seems reasonable to assume that they would be more than willing to act as a "cut-out" or interface so that information and influence could pass between the CIA and the LEIU. And it's hard to imagine the CIA passing up such kind of opportunity.

Of course, it's just possible that the LEIU has never been exploited by the CIA, Army Intelligence, or any other federal agency. And maybe, despite the lawlessness and political spying of many of its member agencies, the LEIU is nothing more than a group of policemen dedicated to fighting organized crime. But even granting such a generous benefit of the doubt, the LEIU remains one of the most potentially dangerous threats to freedom in America.

We have been able to save ourselves from the police state—at least thus far—because the American form of government is equipped with a system of checks and balances that makes executive agencies ultimately accountable to the people. But there is a powerful dossier subculture in America, a vast old-boy network that ties together intelligence agencies, police departments, credit bureaus, private detective agencies, bonding companies, and the many other collectors and compilers of personal information about private citizens. It is an aggregation of police power beyond the direct control of the democratic process.

The LEIU is a part of this subculture, and it is an especially powerful part because it has form, structure, and efficiency. Perhaps it doesn't spy on ordinary citizens, and perhaps it directs its attention solely toward organized crime, but all that could change with a single meeting of the LEIU's executive board. There is no statutory charter that defines the limits of the LEIU's operations, and so it can be and do whatever its members decide it ought to be and do. CIA agents, of course, and despite whatever else is on the secret agenda of the LEIU, the organization continues to supplement the FBI's uncertain war on organized crime. Perhaps the LEIU plays a vital role; perhaps it performs an indispensable function in our national holding action against La Cosa Nostra. But somehow there must be a better way.